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Abstract
In this paper we analyze the impact of fiscal rules on the effectiveness of fiscal policy as a macro-
economic stabilizing instrument. First, we review the available evidence on the effects of fiscal
policy to affect output in the short run and real interest rates and investment and growth in the
long run, and we show how the use of fiscal rules has proved useful in restraining debt and deficits.
Secondly, we discuss whether debt consolidation rules trade off higher output instability in ex-
change for lower deficits, using three alternative representations of the intertemporal substitution
m e c h a n i s mi naS D G Ef r a m e w o r k .O u rm a i nc o n c l u s i o ni st h a tb o t ht h ei m p a c to fd i s c r e t i o n a r y
fiscal policy and the strength of automatic stabilizers are largely unaffected by the 'tightness' of
these rules. Therefore, there is nothing in the design of fiscal rules aimed at preventing huge and
long-lasting deviations of debt from the steady state level, which makes them an impediment to
fiscal policy carrying out its job as a significant stabilizing policy instrument.
Keywords: Fiscal rules, output volatility, automatic stabilizers.
JEL Classification: E32, E52, E63.
1. Introduction
Modern macroeconomic policy making has become progressively constrained by the
concern about the long run effects of misguided monetary and fiscal policies. Whereas
the extent to which monetary and fiscal policies are able to affect output in the short
run is still a matter of debate, the fact that an imprudent use of these instruments may
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have harming medium or longer term effects is widely accepted nowadays. Credibility,
transparency and accountability are the features of modern monetary policy that are
very often represented by simple rules, whose properties have been analyzed in detail
by academics and policy makers alike. Properly designed rules are those capable of
ensuring low and stable inflation while at the same time allowing the Central Bank to
fight downturns in economic activity when these occur. Fiscal policy making is rapidly
evolving along similar lines. The high level of debt accumulated in most advanced
economies from the mid-seventies to mid-nineties has brought sustainability and fiscal
consolidation to the forefront of economic authorities' concerns. Fiscal rules, such as the
Stability and Growth Pact in Europe aim to achieve these goals, while keeping public
finances in good shape to perform their stabilizing duties. In this paper we set up a
framework to discuss whether or not these rules may succeed on both counts, namely
consolidation and stabilization.
We proceed in three steps. In Section 2 we review the available evidence on the
effects of fiscal policy with three particular purposes. We want to confirm first that
taxes and government spending have a non-negligible effect on output in the short run;
next we show that high debt and deficits lead to higher real interest rates and lower
investment and growth in the long run. Final l yw el o o ki n t ot h er e c e n tE M Ue x p e r i e n c e
that suggests that the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP hereafter) has proved to be useful
in restraining debt and deficits.
Fiscal policy seems to be a useful stabilizing instrument in the short run, while high
debt and deficits have harming long-run growth effects. Fiscal rules have been, at least
moderately, successful in preventing fiscal indiscipline, but they have also been blamed
for the limits they impose on active stabilization. In Section 3 we discuss how to answer
this question, namely whether debt consolidation rules trade off higher instability in
exchange for lower deficits. The econometric evidence on the matter is scant and cannot
always be interpreted easily. Output variability is the outcome of many different shocks
and policies and it is difficult to pin down the influence of fiscal policy on it. Instead
we resort to counterfactual analysis in dynamic general equilibrium models calibrated to
reproduce the most salient features of fiscal policy as described in Section 2. We choose
three models that differ from each other in one mechanism, which turns out to be crucial
to understand the effects of fiscal policy: the intertemporal substitution of consumption
and leisure. One word of caution about the definition of fiscal rules is required here . By
fiscal rules, which are defined in more detail below, we mean a feedback reaction of some
component of the budget balance to prevent huge deviations of the debt to GDP ratio
from its steady-state value. In particular we do not discuss other matters such as the 3
per cent limit to budget deficits in the SGP. From a theoretical perspective this issue is ofFISCAL RULES AND MACROECONOMIC STABILITY 3
less relevance, since well functioning fiscal rules do not require such an additional limit
to achieve an equilibrium over-the-cycle budget balance. Also, its empirical relevance is
limited, despite the fact that some countries are experiencing difficulties on this front;
as we shall discuss below a more prudent fiscal position in periods of high growth
would have allowed these economies sufficient room for manoeuvre to increase their
fiscal deficits without hitting the 3 per cent ceiling in the current recession.
In Section 4 we conduct our policy evaluation by comparing several statistics in
our three model economies under alternative fiscal rules. The main results we obtain
can be summarized as follows. Fiscal rules designed to prevent huge and long lasting
deviations of public debt from its steady-state level ('tight rules') do not significantly re-
duce the strength of discretionary fiscal policy as compared with 'loose rules'. Nor do
tight rules diminish the effect of automatic stabilizers to a significant extent. These re-
sults offer an alternative explanation of the empirical evidence for the US states analysed
by Canova and Pappa (2005), who find that the transmission of fiscal disturbances to the
real economy is both qualitatively and quantitatively unaltered by the presence of strict
budget or debt constraints. The extent to which households are able to substitute cur-
rent versus future consumption turns out to be the crucial determinant of our outcomes.
Unlike in the text-book Keynesian model, in a dynamic general equilibrium framework
a fiscal expansion generates a negative wealth effect that counteracts the demand effect
of public spending and/or taxes; when the rule is designed to achieve fast consolida-
tion this wealth effect is weaker, thus allowing a stronger consumption increase and
lower investment fall as a result of the fiscal shock. Interestingly, in models in which
intertemporal substitution is limited the final outcome is the same, although the expla-
nation differs. In this case the wealth effect is very weak and consumption depends on
t h es i z eo ft h ef i s c a ls h o c kt h a tt u r n so u tt ob eb i g g e r ,t h et i g h t e rt h ef i s c a lr u l e .
Section 5 concludes. In general output and consumption volatility, as the ultimate
aims of stabilization policies, are not inevitably higher under rules that put more empha-
sis on fast debt consolidation. We do not claim that fiscal rules cannot be destabilizing
in practice. What we uphold is that such an effect cannot be found easily in three SDGE
models particularly suitable for policy evaluation.
2. Fiscal Policy and Macroeconomic Stabilization: The Empirical
Evidence.
2.1 Short-run effects of fiscal policy
What are the effects of expansionary fiscal policies in the short and medium run? The
empirical evidence in this field is relatively scarce, at least compared with the abundantFISCAL RULES AND MACROECONOMIC STABILITY 4
literature on monetary policy, but in recent years there have been very interesting con-
tributions by Blanchard and Perotti (2002), De Castro (2003), Fatás and Mihov (1998),
Galí, López-Salido and Vallés (2003), Mountford and Uhlig (2004), Perotti (1999, 2002),
or Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004), among others. Blanchard and Perotti (2002),
Galí, López-Salido and Vallés (2003) and Fatás and Mihov (1998) estimate a VAR for the
US economy in which government purchases are a predetermined variable, that is, con-
t e m p o r a n e o u sc a u s a l i t yr u n so n l yi no n ed i rection, from government purchases to the
rest of the economic variables in the VAR. Perotti (2002) has extended this methodol-
ogy to Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and Germany, with somewhat different
results for some variables such as investment and the real short-run interest rate. Moun-
ford and Uhlig (2004) use a sign restriction methodology to identify the effects of fiscal
shocks on the main macroeconomic variables. In line with Blanchard and Perotti (2002)
investment falls in response to a government spending increase. However, in contrast
with Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Galí, López-Salido and Vallés (2003), Mounford
and Uhlig find that private consumption does not change significantly in response to an
unexpected increase in government spending. Some authors such as Ramey and Shapiro
(1997), Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher (1999) or McGrattan and Ohanian (2003) have
focused on particular and well identified episodes of military spending increases which
occurred in the United States. The main conclusion of this literature is that there is a
significant and positive short-run effect on output of these fiscal expansions, which fade
away after some years.
These results are in clear contrast with the other stream of literature in which
contractionary policies have expansionary effects on output. These are the well-known
non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policy. Beginning with the work of Giavazzi and Pagano
(1990) many studies have analyzed the macroeconomic effect of fiscal consolidations.
In their survey to this literature, Hemming, Kell and Mahfouz (2002) conclude that
there are many examples in which fiscal contractions have had expansionary effects on
output, private consumption and investment. As Perotti (1999) has analyzed, the initial
conditions of some key variables can explain why fiscal expansions have a positive effect
in 'good times' but a negative one in 'bad times', where fiscal consolidations are needed.
The studies reviewed so far have focused on the effects of discretionary fiscal poli-
cies on output. The effects of automatic stabilizers are less well known and the empirical
evidence is more scarce. Fatás and Mihov (2001), Galí (1994) and Andrés, Doménech and
Fatás (2004) find a negative correlation between government size and output volatility,
that is, economies with a large government sector exhibit smaller business cycle fluctu-
ations as a consequence of automatic stabilizers. This basic result is shown in Figure
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Figure 1: Standard deviation of GDP per capita growth and government size as a share of GDP in the
OECD, 1960-2002. Source: Andrés, Doménech and Fatás (2004).
Martinez-Mongay and Sekkat (2003) have looked at which measure of government size
best captures this correlation (e.g., personal versus indirect taxes), while other authors
a r g u et h a tt h ep a t t e r ni nF i g u r e1m i g h tb en o nl i n e a ra n dt h a ti tc o u l de v e nb er e v e r s e d
for a very large government size (see Silgoner, Reitschuler and Crespo-Cuaresma, 2003).
Using a different approach Barrell and Pina (2000) analyze the effects of auto-
matic stabilizers by performing stochastic simulations in a forward-looking multi-country
macroeconometric model (NiGEM) for 10 eurozone economies. They find that automatic
stabilizers make output volatility fall in all countries, but that such decreases, ranging
from 5 to 18 per cent, are smaller than commonly believed and display significant in-
ternational variation. In a similar paper, Brunila, Buti and Veld (2003) using the QUEST
model of the European Commission show that automatic stabilizers are a powerful tool
to stabilize shocks to private consumption, but less so in the case of shocks to private
investment and exports. Moreover, in the ca s eo fs u p p l ys i d es h o c k s ,t h es i m u l a t i o n s
show that automatic stabilizers are largely ineffective. What this literature shows is that
it is very difficult to obtain reliable estimates of the effect of automatic stabilizers onFISCAL RULES AND MACROECONOMIC STABILITY 6
output volatility. For this reason, other authors rely on simulations with SDGE mod-
els. One important result of these simulations (see, for example, Galí, 1994, and Andrés
and Doménech, 2005) is that the effects of automatic stabilizers are very sensitive to
some structural features of the economy, in particular the degree of nominal and real
rigidities.
2.2 Long-run effects of fiscal policy
Fiscal policies also have long-run effects, which may or may not go in the same direction
as the ones analyzed so far. Assessing the importance and sign of such effects is of the
utmost importance to ascertain the extent to which governments face an intertemporal
trade-off in pursuing stabilization using fiscal instruments. As we have mentioned, the
VAR literature concludes that fiscal expansions are followed by lower private investment.
This effect is crucial in the debate about Ricardian equivalence: if the private sector
responds to a fiscal expansion with an increase in private saving which compensates
the deterioration of the government budget surplus then we will observe that private
investment and interest rates remain unchanged. In their surveys of this literature Seater
(1993) and Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999) portray a discouraging picture of the empirical
literature on Ricardian equivalence plagued with serious econometric problems in the
specification, in the data, in the endogeneity of the regressors and in the non-stationarity
of the main variables. The global assessment of this literature depends more often than
not on the researcher's beliefs. Doménech, Taguas and Varela (2000), taking into account
these potential sources of misspecification, estimate that private saving in the OECD
between 1960 and 1995 has compensated for only 40 per cent of the augments in public
deficits, a result that is robust to the exclusion of countries in the sample. The empirical
evidence for the United States and EMU is that the deterioration of public saving, which
is the main cause of larger government deficits, was not compensated by private saving,
resulting in a lower national saving rate, as shown in Figures 2 and 3.2 Although
the recent evidence by Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002) is that the correlation between
domestic saving and investment (the Feldsteisn and Horioka, 1980, puzzle) has declined
in more recent years, implying a more frequent resort to foreign savings, this correlation
is still very high as depicted in Figures 4 and 5.
Consistent with the VAR results above, the deterioration of budget surpluses has
resulted in lower investment rates. Nevertheless, the debate about Ricardian equivalence
has further important implications for the tra d e - o f fb e t w e e nt h ee f f e c t so ff i s c a lp o l i c y
in the short and long run. If we accept Ricardian equivalence there is not much sense
2 The data for Figures 2 to 7 have been taken from different issues of the OECD Economic
Outlook. EMU figures refer to non-weighted averages.FISCAL RULES AND MACROECONOMIC STABILITY 7
in pursuing discretionary fiscal policies with a stabilization objective, since all fiscal
measures are equivalent to balanced budget policies whose multiplier effect is very small;
by the same token, the long-run negative effect of these actions is limited to the distortions
introduced by income and value added taxes, since neither debt levels nor real interest
rates would be affected. On the contrary, if we reject Ricardian equivalence, discretionary
fiscal policies may have substantial stabilizing effects in the short run but with important
costs in the long run.
If private saving compensates for only a fraction of public deficits, then fiscal ex-
pansions financed with public debt should increase real interest rates. Although the
preliminary empirical evidence both in the United States and EMU is that the periods
with higher deficits in the eighties and the first half of the nineties have coincided with
higher (ex-post) long-run real interest rates, as shown by Figures 6 and 7, the economet-
ric evidence is mixed and controversial.3 Gale and Orszag (2002) review the literature on
the effects of government deficits and interest rates (see Table 1) and find that all general
equilibrium models used for simulations in the USA, both estimated econometrically or
calibrated, yield a positive relationship between public deficit and interest rates. They
also find that the empirical evidence based on reduced form equations is not conclu-
sive, although those models which incorporate future deficit expectations always find a
positive and statistically significant relationship. Most papers using the Congress Bud-
get Office (CBO) deficit projections find that high deficits are associated with increases
i nt h er e a li n t e r e s tr a t eb e t w e e n40 − 60 basis points. A representative paper of this
stream in the literature is the research by Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2002). These au-
thors find that the interest rate differential between short and long-run maturities in the
United States has diminished when the CBO has improved its expectations of budget
surplus in a horizon of 5 to 10 years, that is, financial markets have reacted by lower-
ing the interest rate when the expectations about future fiscal discipline improve. Engen
and Hubbard (2004) reach similar results in the case of public deficit, although much
more moderate estimates in the case of public debt. A similar exercise has been done
by the European Commission (2004), finding that one additional point of deficit raises
long-term interest rates by about 15 − 20 basis points.
Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2002) also estimate a VAR similar to Blanchard and
Perotti (2002) but introducing inflation, commodity prices, bank reserves, FED funds
rates and 10 year Treasury bond rates (constant maturity), finding that an increase in
public spending produces a positive and signifi c a n ti n t e r e s tr a t er e s ponse, mainly at long-
3 T ot h ep o i n tt h a tt h ea c t u a ld e b a t ea b o u tt h ep u b l i cd e f i c i t si nt h eU n i t e dS t a t e si sa l s op o l i t -
ical (see Stiglitz, 2004), with republicans cutting taxes and causing huge deficits and democrats















































































Figure 2: National and public saving in the United States, 1960-2001. The correlation between both
variables (corr) is 0.7, and the cooeficient of the regression of the national saving rate on public saving is








































































Figure 3: National and public saving in EMU, 1960-2001. The correlation between both variables (corr) is
0.82, and the cooeficient of the regression of the national saving rate on public saving is 0.83 (t-ratio equal
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Figure 4: Correlation between saving and investment rates in the USA, 1960-2001. The correlation between
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Figure 5: Correlation between saving and investment rates in EMU, 1960-2001. The correlation between
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Figure 6: Real interest rates and budget surpluses in the United States, 1962-2001. The correlation between
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Figure 7: Real interest rates and budget surpluses in EMU, 1966-2001. The correlation between both
variables (corr) is −0.7.FISCAL RULES AND MACROECONOMIC STABILITY 11
Table 1
Deficit and interest rates in the literature
Number of papers finding a correlation...
Measure of deficit and debt Positive Mixed Non-sig.
Future and non-anticipated 12 4 1
VAR 2 2 6
Current 14 5 12
Total 28 11 19
Source: Gale and Orszag (2002)
run horizons, in contrast with previous results in this literature (Plosser, 1982 and 1987,
Evans, 1987a and 1987b). Other evidence on the effects on interest rates is presented
by Poterba and Rueben (1999) and Bayoumi and Woglom (1995), who find that the
cost of financing public debt increases with the ratio of public debt to GDP, mainly
because of a higher risk premium. A similar effect has been found by Bayoumi, Goldstein
and Woglom (1995): those rules promoting fiscal discipline give place to lower interest
rates and risk premia through better ratings. The empirical evidence for EMU countries
seems to confirm these results even in a monetary union since those countries with a
higher public debt to GDP ratio face on average a higher internal return of public debt.
For example, Bernoth, von Hagen and Schuknecht (2004) have studied the bond yield
differentials among EU eurobonds issued between 1991 and 2002, finding that interest
rate differentials contain risk premia which increase with debt, deficit and the debt-
service ratio. Thus, a reduction in the risk premia induces a considerable reduction in
the interest rate. In a recent paper, Ardagna, Caselli and Lane (2004) have used a panel
of 16 OECD countries over several decades to analyze the effect of government deficits
and debts on long-term interest rates. Their results show that in static specifications
a one-percentage-point increment in the primary deficit as a share of GDP leads to a
10-basis point increase in the interest rate. This effect is larger (150 basis points) after
10 years according to the cumulative response estimated with a vector autoregression.
Domestic public debt affects interest rates only in countries with above-average levels of
debt, whereas higher levels of public debt in t h es a m p l eo fO E C Dc o u n t r i e sa l s oi n c r e a s e
each country's interest rates.
If deficit spending implies higher interest rates and lower private investment,
most growth theories (for example, Mankiw, Romer and Weil, 1992) predict a lower per
capita income or long-run growth. Therefore, fiscal deficits have an indirect effect upon
growth through capital accumulation. However, a negative direct effect has been di-
rectly confirmed empirically by some authors, even after controlling by the investment
rate. For example, Fischer (1993) and Andrés, Doménech and Molinas (1996) estimateFISCAL RULES AND MACROECONOMIC STABILITY 12
growth equations for a wide sample of countries, including the investment rate (indi-
rect effect) and fiscal deficit (direct effect), finding a negative and significant effect of
deficits on growth. More recently, Kneller, Bleaney and Gemmell (1999) have confirmed
these results using a sample of OECD countries and controlling for differences in the
composition of public spending and revenues. Their estimates show that budget deficits
have a negative effect on economic growth, with a coefficient even larger than that for
distortionary taxes (labour and capital income).
It is also important to notice that the composition of the public expenditure fi-
nanced with debt may be very relevant in order to asses the effects upon economic
growth. For example, Kneller, Bleaney and Gemmell (1999) find that public investment
has a positive effect on growth which is non-significant in the case of public consump-
tion. Nevertheless, very high public investment may render it unproductive, as it has
been pointed out, among others, by Devarajan, Swaroop and Zou (1999). Therefore the
trade-off between short-run and long-run effects of fiscal policy is quite sensitive to the
fiscal policy instrument (the type of public consumption or investment) being used.
2.3 Fiscal rules and debt consolidation
Fiscal rules are designed to reduce the level of debt or at least to prevent the debt/GDP
ratio from increasing further in each economic cycle. In the case of EMU countries, fiscal
consolidations were forced by the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact.
For these countries the evidence analyzed by the European Commission (2004) confirms
a change in the response of primary budget surpluses to public debt in 1994, after the
approval of the Maastricht Treaty. The type of fiscal rules estimated by the European
Commission is similar to the ones estimated by Ballabriga and Mongay (2002) or Gali
and Perotti (2003), and consists in regressing the primary budget surplus expressed as a
percentage of HP trend output (pbs)f o rc o u n t r yi in year t on the output gap (yc), the
lagged public debt to trend output ratio (d) and the lagged dependent variable:
pbsit = αi + βyc
it + γdit−1 + ρpbsit−1 + uit (1)
where αi is a country fixed effect.4 Equation (1) is estimated for 11 EU countries for the
period 1970-93 (the pre-Maastricht period) and 1994-2003.
The estimation results confirm some previous findings by Gali and Perotti (2003).
First, before the Maastricht Treaty the primary budget balance showed little correlation
with the output gap, whereas this (partial) correlation is positive and statistically signifi-
cant in the consolidation period. Therefore, fiscal consolidation has not been an obstacle
4 To account for possible problems of endogeneity, the output gap is instrumented with its own















































Figure 8: Cyclically adjusted budget balance in percetage of trend GDP. Source: European Commission
AMECO Data Set, June 2004.
for the primary budget surplus to become even more countercyclical after 1993. Sec-
ondly, the coefficient γ, which measures the response of the primary budget surplus to
the lagged debt to trend GDP ratio, is more than three times larger in the consolidation
period than in the pre-Maastricht one. Finally, there has been a reduction in the persis-
tence of primary budget balances in the second period. Therefore, the results indicate
that fiscal policy has been more stabilizing, more debt consolidating and less persistent
after the introduction of the current fiscal framework in EMU.
Nevertheless, some symptoms of fiscal fatigue in this process of debt consolidation
have arisen in the last downturn, when some countries in EMU are no longer complying
with the rules imposed by the SGP, exhibiting a budget deficit in terms of GDP above
the 3 per cent threshold. Although the slow growth in these countries has been blamed
for this deterioration of public finances, this can be traced back to the previous years of
high growth during which there was a relaxation of fiscal consolidation after countries
entered EMU. In fact, the recent recession has been much milder than previous ones
but the structural budget balances had been worsening even before the downturn in
2000 (Figure 8), due to discretionary fiscal changes. This is one of the main conclusions
of Hughes-Halles, Lewis and von Hagen (2004), who measure consolidation efforts by
means of the likelihood of starting a consolidation (probit models) and the duration of
these (hazard models). Their findings coincide with what Figure 8 shows, namely thatFISCAL RULES AND MACROECONOMIC STABILITY 14
the period of stronger consolidation efforts and fiscal discipline has been the run up
to the Euro in which countries made the greatest sustained efforts to meet Maastricht
criteria. Since then fiscal discipline has been weakening steadily. According to these
authors, at this pace, the beneficial effects of the Maastricht Treaty and the SGP will
be over in less than a decade. Therefore, sound public finances in terms of the SGP
cannot be achieved if countries do not consolidate more strongly in periods of high
growth. Another interesting remark of Figure 8 is that given the actual size of the
cyclical component of the budget surplus, EMU countries would have satisfied the SGP
if their cyclically adjusted budget balance h a db e e nc l o s et oz e r o .T h i sc o n c l u s i o ni s
reinforced by the evidence presented in Table 2, which offers a similar conclusion to the
evidence presented by Buti, Franco and Ongena (1998). Using estimates of the cyclical
component of the budget balance in terms of GDP by the European Commission we have
checked which has been the greatest value of the cyclical deficit from 1970 onwards, as
well as the minimum growth rate of GDP during those particular episodes.5 As we
can see, deficits greater than 3 per cent of GDP have been the exception rather than the
r u l e ,i np a r t i c u l a ri nb i gc o u n t r i e ss u c ha sG e r m a n y ,F r a n c e ,I t a l y ,t h eU Ka n dS p a i n .
Moreover, in all the cases in which the deficit exceeded 3 percent of GDP, the rate of
growth of GDP was negative, so the excessive deficit procedure of the SGP would not
have been applied. In other words, if EMU countries had exhibited close to balance
structural budgets, they would have faced in general the big recessions of the last three
decades without breaching the limits imposed by the SGP.
3. Modeling the effect of fiscal policy.
As we have discussed in the previous section, there are still many points of disagree-
ment among researchers as to the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy. However, our
reading of the recent evidence and the literature suggests three major findings in this
field that motivate our analysis in this section. First, there is a sufficient amount of
empirical evidence on the matter to conclude that discretionary fiscal policy has sub-
stantial, though short-lived, effects on aggregate spending and employment. The effect
of automatic stabilizers is more difficult to gauge, but the existing evidence and model
simulations lead us to conclude that these are also useful to dampen macroeconomic fluc-
tuations, at least in economies with real and nominal rigidities. Secondly, as far as the
long-run incidence of fiscal policy is concerned, the available evidence points towards a
non-negligible growth-reducing effect of excessive debt and deficits. Finally, fiscal rules,
such as the SGP, are useful to impose some restraints on budget balances; furthermore,
5 The evidence for the Spanish economy comes from Corrales, Doménech and Varela (2002).FISCAL RULES AND MACROECONOMIC STABILITY 15
Table 2
Minimum cyclical component of budget balance
Country Year Deficit GDP growth rate
Belgium 1983 1.42 0.31
Denmark 1993 3.24 -0.01
Germany 1987 1.58 1.47
Greece 1996 0.76 -1.16
Spain 1993 1.79 -1.17
France 1997 0.88 1.10
Ireland 1994 2.42 2.70
Italy 1993 0.95 -0.88
Netherlands 1983 2.40 -1.28
Austria 1987 0.75 1.63
Portugal 1985 1.74 -1.99
Finland 1993 5.86 -6.39
Sweden 1993 3.66 -2.00
UK 1982 2.06 -1.44
Source: see text.
the current 3 per cent deficit limit does not seem to be an impediment to pursuing ac-
tive stabilization during recessions, provided that fiscal consolidation is achieved when
output is close to its potential level.
In principle, fiscal discipline and active stabilization are not necessarily incom-
patible. There is nothing preventing a close-to-zero over-the-cycle budget balance from
incorporating an active discretionary policy as well as taxes and transfers that are cycli-
cally sensitive. However, the evolution of debt to output ratios during the eighties and,
to a lesser extent, since EMU started, indicates that economic authorities are keen on
relying heavily on fiscal stimuli to avoid low growth rates, but do not retrench pub-
lic spending in booms, or at least not in the proportion needed to maintain structural
budget surpluses. Programs of fiscal restraint, aimed at maintaining fiscal discipline
incorporate some form or another of fiscal rules. These rules are designed to prevent
deficits from exceeding some given target level, or to avoid further increases in the debt
to output ratio, or even to seek substantial reductions in it.
On what grounds is the success of these rules to be assessed? There would be
little disagreement about the matter if it had to be settled merely on the basis of the
observed path of debts and deficits. If these are substantially reduced, then rules are
fine, otherwise they are flawed. However, these are not the grounds on which rules areFISCAL RULES AND MACROECONOMIC STABILITY 16
to be appraised. In some quarters, the blame on fiscal rules does not refer so much to
their observed performance in terms of consolidation but mainly to their alleged effects
on the capability of fiscal policy in helping to achieve output stabilization. Whatever
their design, these regulations impose some sort of limitation on the power of govern-
ments to run public finances. In some cases there are limits to deficits, but in any case
medium-term equilibrium requires that current changes in public revenues and/or pub-
lic spending ought to be reversed at some time in the future. Thus, fiscal rules have been
blamed for the restriction they pose on fiscal policy. First, limits to current deficits do
simply prevent further tax cuts and/or spending increases when the economy is oper-
ating near the ceiling. Secondly, rules designed to ensure consolidation do signal future
fiscal actions that may affect the stabilizing capability of current fiscal policy.
Not much can be said as regards the first criticism. There are two issues at stake
here. One is related to the fiscal rule itself: if it is ill-designed it may be too tight and
the economy would be likely to jump into it in moderate recessions. Whether some of
the existing regulations, and in particular the 3 per cent deficit limit in the SGP, are too
strict is a matter of empirical evidence but, as we discussed before, running a balanced
budget or even a small deficit at potential output would have given fiscal policy in EU
economies substantial room for manoeuvre.6 If the economy has a structural deficit close
to 3 percent of GDP, it is obvious that the SGP constitutes an important restriction for
the stabilization effects of both automatic stabilizers or countercyclical discretionary fiscal
policy in a downturn. However, in this singular scenario the issue about the effects on
output stabilization of this deficit limit is of little theoretical interest. It is self-evident that
if the 3 per cent limit becomes binding, the government is forced to follow a procyclical
public expenditure policy. On the other hand, fiscal rules do not need any additional
limit. On purely theoretical grounds a rule that aims at keeping the debt level under
control only needs some kind of contemporaneous or delayed feedback from some of the
components of the budget. Thus, we find a more interesting exercise in analyzing the
influence of fiscal rules when that limit is not binding and it merely aims at stabilizing
the level of public debt around a target level. This is the spirit of the current proposals
made by the European Commission about how to improve the implementation of the
SGP.
The second criticism is more relevant and it is the one we are going to focus on.
T h ee v i d e n c ed i s c u s s e di nt h ep r e v i o u ss e c t ion pertains to a time span in which fiscal
discipline was not at its best and then a natural question arises: to what extent will
6 It must also be borne in mind that the effectivene s so ff i s c a ls h o c k si sg r e a t l yd i m i n i s h e di f
the public sector is running a deficit in the first place, and that the aforementioned non-Keynesian
fiscal multipliers are likely to arise in such situation.FISCAL RULES AND MACROECONOMIC STABILITY 17
the effectiveness of fiscal policy be altered by the imposition of fiscal discipline? Most
existing rules impose limits either on the debt to output ratio or on the deficit level or
on both, implying that a current deficit must turn into future surpluses and viceversa,
thus inducing procyclical movements in fiscal policies. This must have an effect on the
behavior of forward-looking agents that take into account the whole path of expected
future events when making their decisions. A proper understanding of the implications
of these rules requires a full blown dynamic general equilibrium framework. Policy
evaluation should be carried out in models specified at the level of preferences and
technology. The exercises that follow are mo d e ls p e c i f i ca n ds h o u l db et a k e na ss u c h ,
but in order to ensure a broad scope for our results we take special care in the choice of
t h em o d e l sa sw e l la si nt h ep a r a m e t e rv a l u e s .
We choose a fairly general model that features a number of frictions that have been
found relevant to reproduce the observed response to fiscal shocks. Since fiscal polices
involve a trade-off between current and future disposable income, the opportunity set
available to households and the mechanism of intertemporal substitution are crucial
determinants of the effects of fiscal policy on output. Thus we consider three alternative
views of the intertemporal substitution channel in an otherwise common theoretical
framework; when necessary, we allow for some differences in parameter values to make
the impulse response functions of each model as close to the empirical ones as possible.
T h ef i r s to n ei sas t a n d a r dn e o - K e y n e s i a nm o d el in which all consumers are fully rational
and behave as intertemporal maximizers (R, hereafter).7 The second model is one in
which infinitely lived households may lend and borrow in the financial market only
limited by the market interest rate, but in which a fraction of consumers choose to
maximize on a period-by-period basis, without engaging in intertemporal substitution
of any kind. This friction has been introduced in an otherwise neoclassical framework by
Galí, López-Salido and Vallés (2003) who show that a non-negligible proportion of such
'rule-of-thumb' consumers (RoT hereafter) is needed to reproduce some of the effects
of fiscal policy obtained in the VAR literature.8 The third model is based on Andrés,
Doménech and Leith (2006), who consider households with full access to unrestricted
financial markets, but whose intertemporal behavior is affected by a positive probability
of death (Blanchard, 1985, and Yaari, 1965); in this setting, consumers are finitely lived
(FL, hereafter) affecting their discount rate. All three models are calibrated to mimic the
average market European economy.
In the RoT model the fraction of rational households choose leisure (1 − lt)a n d
consumption (ct) to maximize fairly general, non-separable utility function as,
7 The model is described in detail in Andrés and Doménech (2005).
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(2)
Households allocate their income (labor income, capital income, interest payments on
bond holdings (Bt), their share of profits of the firms (Ωit), and public transfers (Ptgs
t))
and current cash holdings to buy consumption and investment goods (et), and to accu-
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Money is needed for transactions and there is a cash-in-advance constraint that links
money demand (Mt) and current cash transfers (τm
t )t oc o n s u m p t i o n ,
Pt(1 + τc
t)ct ≤ Mt + τm
t (4)
The tax structure includes taxes on labor income (τw
t ), capital income (τk
t ) and consump-
tion (τc
t). The accumulation of capital is made by households, who face a constant de-
preciation rate (δ) and installation costs Φ(et/kt). Rule-of-thumb consumers (of whom
there is a proportion λ) solve the optimization problem in a static manner, since they do
not have access to the financial market, nor do they decide to save for the future.
The economy is populated by i intermediate goods producing firms. Each firm
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where ρt,t+j is a price kernel representing the marginal utility value to the representative
household of an additional unit of profits accrued in period t+j, β the discount factor,FISCAL RULES AND MACROECONOMIC STABILITY 19
mct,t+j the marginal cost at t + j of the firm changing prices at t and κ af i x e dc o s to f
production. The remaining (φ per cent) firms set Pit = πPit−1 where π is the steady-state









The optimal combination of capital (k)a n dl a b o r( l) is obtained from the cost
minimization process of the firm:
min
kit,lit




it − κ (9)
where wt is the real wage, rt is the rental cost of capital and κ is a fixed cost that ensures
zero profits at the steady state. Total factor productivity, At, follows the process,
lnAt = ρz lnAt−1 + za
t (10)
where za
t is white noise and 0 < ρz < 1.
The budget constraint is given by
Ptτw







+ Bt − Mt+1 + Mt (11)
Monetary policy is represented by a standard Taylor rule:
it = ρrit−1 +( 1− ρr)i +( 1− ρr)ρπ(πt − π)+( 1− ρr)ρye yt + zi
t (12)
in which the monetary authority sets the interest rate (it) to prevent inflation deviating
from its steady-state level (πt − π) and to counteract movements in the output gap (e yt);
i is the steady-state interest rate and the current rate moves smoothly (0 < ρr < 1).
Finally, the calibrated parameters in Table 3 are taken from Andrés, Doménech and
Fatás (2004).
The R model can be understood as a particular case of the previous one in which
λ =0 . In order to produce positive responses of output to fiscal shocks, preferences
are calibrated in a slightly different manner; we also change the tax structure somewhat
to match the steady-state values.9 The FL model also incorporates a few changes with
9 In particular, σ =3 ,η =0 .4453,τ
w =0 .43,τ
k =0 .21,τ
c =0 .14. We have chosen a lower elas-
ticity of intertemporal substitution than in model R. We do so to obtain a positive fiscal multuplierFISCAL RULES AND MACROECONOMIC STABILITY 20
Table 3
Calibration of baseline model, from Andrés, Doménech and Fatás (2004)
σβη αεδ πρ z λκ
1.0 0.993 0.44 0.40 6.0 0.021 1.020.25 0.80 0.65 0.31
τw τk τc gc/y gs/y ρr ρπ ρy φ
0.279 0.279 0.10 0.18 0.16 0.5 1.7 0.1 0.75
respect to the RoT model. We assume logarithmic preferences both in consumption and
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This alters the dynamics of consumption since, under a positive probability of death



















4. Fiscal rules and stabilization
Using the models discussed above we approach the assessment of the effects of fiscal
rules on macroeconomic stabilization by first looking at the incidence of such rules on
the effectiveness of discretionary fiscal policy, and then analyzing its incidence on the
effectiveness of automatic stabilizers in the presence of technology shocks.




















t is public consumption, bt−j represent real debt and yt−j the level of output
in consumption that would be negative for lower values of σ. This makes the model slightly more
realistic and hence more likely to generate higher output volatility under tight fiscal rules.FISCAL RULES AND MACROECONOMIC STABILITY 21
at t − j and ε
g
t is an innovation with moderate persistence. αb determines the intensity
of debt consolidation and αy tells us whether the government is pursuing an active
countercyclical behavior on gc
t, over and above the need to consolidate the level of debt.
We set j =1and rules will be defined according to the value of the parameters αb and
αy.
These features do not exhaust the forms that a fiscal rule may adopt and a general
discussion about the properties of different alternatives is beyond the aim of this article
(the interested reader may consider the study by Mitchell, Sault and Wallis, 2000). In
particular, there are two types of rules we shall not analyze in this paper: those defined
i nt e r m so fad e f i c i tt a r g e ti n s t e a do fad e b t target, and those in which consolidation
is sought by means of income tax rather than government spending adjustments (for
example, Pérez and Hiebert, 2004). Since the deficit target also includes the debt level,
alternative definitions of the target should not be of much empirical relevance for the
purpose at hand. Whether the rule is defined on taxes or public spending is of more
importance. This issue has been discussed in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (1997), Canzoneri,
Cumby and Diva (2004), and Railavo (2004), among others, who show that rules relying
on income tax adjustment are bound to induce high output variability if the labor supply
is sufficiently elastic. We view this as a related but separate matter, namely one on how
the rule is designed, rather than on the influence of the rule as such. Since the design of
the rule interacts with other features of the model, calling for a more detailed look into
the labor market, we leave this for further research.
4.1 Discretionary fiscal policy
Discretionary fiscal stimuli are used to counteract the effect of shocks that affect output
and consumption negatively. The fact that these fiscal changes are effective in affecting
output is confirmed by the empirical evidence reviewed in Section 2, but it may be
argued that a strict commitment to a debt target may diminish the effectiveness of these
changes, since a rise in public spending or a tax cut must be compensated by a change
of opposite sign in these variables sometime in the future.
Figure 9 compares the impulse responses (in percentage) of the three main com-
ponents of aggregate demand to a 1 per cent impulse in public consumption under
t w oa l t e r n a t i v er u l e si nt h eR o Tm o d e l . I nb o t hc a s e sαy =0 , so that public spend-
ing does not have a direct countercyclical function. The continuous line represents the
economy with the minimum consolidation effort compatible with a monetary equilib-
rium (αb =0 .2), whereas the dotted line represents an economy under a more strict
('tight') rule (αb =2 .0). Not surprisingly, the dynamics of public debt are markedly dif-
ferent across economies. When the consolidation effort is weak ('loose' rule), public debtFISCAL RULES AND MACROECONOMIC STABILITY 22









































Figure 9: Impulse-response functions (in %) after a public consumption shock (of 1%) in the RoT model.
In the tight rule αc
b =2(solid line), whereas in the loose rule αc
b =0 .2 (dotted line).
remains above its target for more than 40 quarters, whereas under the tight rule, this
difference is much lower and it vanishes in about 15 quarters. It is striking that this
sharp contrast does not translate into substantial differences in the dynamic responses of
output, consumption and investment that look remarkably similar. If any, the accumu-
lated response of output, consumption and employment are slightly higher under the
rule with αb =2 .0.
The reason why consumption rises by more can be explained by the intensity of
the fiscal shock under both rules and it is the combination of two effects. The shock
generates a temporary deficit, thus requiring a downward adjustment on government
spending with an intensity that depends on the nature of the fiscal rule (the size of
αb). Under a tight rule, the downward adjustment on public spending is stronger, thus
reducing the overall persistence of the fiscal shock and the associated negative wealth
effect (see Galí, López-Salido and Vallés, 2003). This moderates the fall of consumption
of optimizing households as well as the increase in the labor supply of these agents.
Given the increase in labor demand (needed to meet the additional demand) this leads
to a greater increase in real wages under the tight rule, and hence to a greater increase
in the consumption of non-optimizing households. The crowding-out in investment isFISCAL RULES AND MACROECONOMIC STABILITY 23
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Figure 10: Impulse-response functions (in %) after a public consumption shock (1%) in the R and FL
models. In the tight rule (solid line) αc
b =2 .0,w h e r e a si nt h el o o s er u l e( d o t t e dl i n e )αc
b =0 .2.
also less intense for high values of αb.
This result carries over alternative models of consumer behavior. In Figure 10
we report the impulse responses, again for the alternative fiscal rules in the models
with λ =0and with finite lives (R and FL models respectively). The incidence of
alternative rules goes in the same direction. Output multipliers are virtually unaffected
by the response of public consumption, whereas private consumption tends to react more
strongly to fiscal shocks in the case of a tougher fiscal rule. In both models, the fall in
investment is more moderate under a more severe rule. The explanation given for the
RoT model carries over the two other cases, although here only one of these effects is
present. Tighter rules mean less persistence of the shock to government spending, and
stronger consumption and investment responses. Therefore, the multipliers associated
with private GDP (total output minus public spending) are significantly increased when
t h er u l ei m p o s e saf a s tr e t u r nt ot h es t e a d ys t a t e .
According to the empirical evidence reviewed in Section 2, efforts to render fiscal
policy more disciplined seem to have been accompanied by some success on making
it more purposely countercyclical too (European Commission, 2004, Galí and Perotti,FISCAL RULES AND MACROECONOMIC STABILITY 24










































Figure 11: Impulse-response functions (in %) after a public consumption shock (1%) in the RoT model. In
the acyclical rule (solid line) αc
y =0 , whereas in the countercyclical rule (dotted line) αc
y = −1.
2003). To assess the effect of this change we look at the implications of a stabilizing
component in basic rule: αy = −1. Notice that all that is needed for a fiscal rule
to ensure stationarity of the debt to output ratio is that it must contain a feedback
component to the deviation of that ratio from its steady state. This does not impose any
restriction on other parameters of the rule and, in particular, it does not prevent the rule
from being active against cyclical movements in output.
T h ep r e s e n c eo fs u c hac o m p o n e n ti nt h er u l eh a sv e r yl i t t l ee f f e c ti nt h o s em o d -
els in which consumers have no limitations to intertemporal substitution, models R and
FL. This is so because the cyclical response of gc does not affect substantially the present
value of the wealth effect associated with the fiscal shock. In the model with a signifi-
cant proportion of restricted consumers, the differences are somewhat larger, since the
countercyclical component of the rule diminishes the size of the fiscal shock that curtails
the response of consumption. The impulse responses depicted in Figure 11 indicate that
a countercyclical component in the rules reduces the responses of output, consumption
and investment in absolute value, as expected.FISCAL RULES AND MACROECONOMIC STABILITY 25
4.2 Automatic stabilizers
Income and consumption taxes make public revenues dependent on economic activity.
Income taxes are progressive inducing an elasticity of tax revenues to income greater
than one, but aggregate revenues move roughly one-to-one with aggregate output in
most developed countries (Van den Noord, 2000). Income and consumption taxes smooth
away disposable income along the cycle, thus contributing to dampening macroeconomic
fluctuations, but this effect might be endangered by procyclical fiscal responses induced
by fiscal rules.
To assess the importance of this undermining effect of fiscal rules we perform a
number of exercises measuring the strength of automatic stabilizers following technology
shocks. Now we focus our attention mostly on the R model as the benchmark case, since
the initial response to a technology shock in the model with a high proportion of non-
maximizers (RoT) consumers is a fall in hours, output and consumption. This result
may be well explained in a model with substantial frictions and has been discussed
thoroughly in the literature (see Galí, 1999, Rotemberg, 2003, and Basu, Fernald and
Kimball, 2004). However, this framework is somewhat less useful for the purpose at
hand since the fall in activity leads to a rise in public debt, which implies a downward
adjustment in public spending. Thus public spending tends to be negatively correlated
with tax stabilizers, contrary to the widespread view that fiscal rules may induce positive
comovements between public consumption and tax revenues.
Impulse responses
First we look at the impulse response functions when the economy is hit by a shock to
total factor productivity. Given a technology shock, automatic stabilizers help to dampen
the output, consumption and investment response. Then keeping the size of the shock
constant we measure if the impulse response to the shock and the dynamic paths of debt
and deficit are affected by the rule.
Figure 12 depicts the response of the three main components of aggregate demand
and that of public debt to a temporary but quite persistent shock to the Solow residual
in the R model. As expected, the positive shock induces a fall in public debt, which
returns to its steady-state value at a pace that depends on the consolidation coefficient
in the rule. With αb =2the deviation is low (reaching a maximum of 0.4 percent) and
relatively short-lived, while it is larger and far more persistent under the benchmark
rule.
The choice of a more demanding fiscal rule has a very small incidence on the
dynamics of output. The rule with a strong consolidation bias lessens somewhat the re-
sponses of investment and consumption, especially the latter. This is consistent with theFISCAL RULES AND MACROECONOMIC STABILITY 26











































Figure 12: Impulse-response functions after a technology shock in the R model. In the tight rule (solid
line) αc
b =2 .0, whereas in the loose rule (dotted line) αc
b =0 .2.
results of Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2004), who find that tight fiscal rules defined
on government spending are welfare enhancing, even in framework in which the fiscal
shock triggered by the rule does not crowd out consumption. The fall in public debt trig-
gers an expected response in public consumption which is stronger and more persistent
f o rh i g h e rv a l u e so fαb =2 . Then the associated negative wealth effect is also stronger
i nt h ec a s eo fat i g h tr u l e ,t h u sr e d u c i n gt h ei m p a c tr e s p o n s eo fc o n s u m p t i o n( a n di n -
vestment) as compared with the loose rule, in which the increase in public spending is
much smoother over time.
Figure 13 depicts similar results for the two alternative settings (RoT and FL). The
impulse responses in the model with finitely lived agents (right-hand panel) resemble
those in the model with rational infinitely lived consumers. The small quantitative
differences among the two models can be explained by the slightly higher discount
rate that agents with a positive probability of death face each period. In the RoT model
the differences among the alternative rules are larger and qualitatively different. Take
the case in which αb =0 .2 first. Here we obtain a standard result in the literature:
an increase in total factor productivity in a model with high rigidities may lead to aFISCAL RULES AND MACROECONOMIC STABILITY 27
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Figure 13: Impulse-response functions (in %) after a technology shock (1%) in the RoT and FL models. In
the tight rule (solid line) αc
b =2 , whereas in the loose rule (dotted line) αc
b =0 .2.
fall in hours worked as well as in the real wage. Thus, consumption of rule-of-thumb
households falls sharply, and so does total consumption and output. This is so despite
the increase in consumption of optimizing households induced by the fall in public
consumption, which generates a positive wealth effect (notice that the fall in hours and
consumption generates a deficit on impact). These effects are almost reversed under
the more consolidating rule: output rises and consumption does not fall on impact.
The explanation lies in the size of the fiscal shock induced by the initial deficit that
accompanies the productivity increase. The first rule is associated with a mild downward
response of public spending, whereas the second one triggers a sharp fall in government
consumption, which makes the increase in consumption and investment of optimizing
consumers stronger. Thus, wages fall less and the consumption of RoT consumers is less
affected.
The presence of an explicit stabilizing component in basic rule (αy = −1)d o e s
have a tiny effect in the shape of the response functions in all three models. Figure
14 depicts the results for the R model, and the others are largely similar, although this
term makes a somewhat substantial difference (in the expected direction, i.e. making theFISCAL RULES AND MACROECONOMIC STABILITY 28









































Figure 14: Impulse-response functions (in %) after a technology shock (1%) in the R model when αb =2 .
In the acyclical rule (solid line) αc
y =0 , whereas in the countercyclical rule (dotted line) αc
y = −1.
economy more stable) in the economy in which some consumers follow rule-of-thumb
behavior. This is so for the same reasons discussed in the case of the fiscal shock.
Output volatility
Impulse responses give us a hint of the dynamic shape of output and other macroeco-
nomic variables in alternative fiscal scenarios. But the ultimate aim of stabilization policy
is to reduce the volatility of output and consumption. Next we look in more detail at the
incidence of fiscal rules on the standard deviation of these two variables. To do so we
carry out a simulation exercise to obtain the standard deviation of output, consumption
and investment in our three economies under different parameterizations of the fiscal
rules. The model with transitory supply shocks has been simulated 100 times, produc-
ing 200 observations. We take the last 100 observations and compute the averages over
the 100 simulations of the standard deviation of each variable of interest.
The results are summarized in Table 4, which compares tight (αb =2 .0)w i t hl o o s e
(αb =0 .2) rules with (αy = −1.0)a n dw i t h o u t( αy =0 .0) the direct countercyclical
response of public spending. Two general patterns emerge. First in models R and FL,
output volatility increases as the tightness of fiscal policy increases, while it falls inFISCAL RULES AND MACROECONOMIC STABILITY 29
Table 4
Standard deviation caused by technology shocks
RR o TF L
αy =0 ,αb =0 .2 σy 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000a
σc 0.6237 1.4261 0.7763
σe 3.1333 4.4451 2.9544
αy =0 ,αb =2 .0 σy 1.0444 0.8460 1.0214
σc 0.5924 1.1018 0.7395
σe 3.4455 6.0137 2.9597
αy = −1,αb =0 .2 σy 0.9592 0.9149 0.9688b
σc 0.7080 1.3354 0.8360
σe 3.5227 4.6805 3.3393
αy = −1,αb =2 .0 σy 1.0161 0.7669 0.9984
σc 0.6086 1.1040 0.7734
σe 3.7597 6.1410 3.2744
(a) αb =0 .50,(b)αb =0 .60
the RoT model. Secondly, as expected, output volatility is always smaller in models
with active stabilization component. A closer look reveals that the attempts to avoid
large deviations in debt from its steady state does not endanger output stabilization in
a significant manner. Even in the cases in which output volatility increases with the
tightness of the rule (R and FL), this increase is barely significant (below 3 per cent),
whereas the standard deviation of output drops by 45 percent in the RoT model.
Turning our attention now towards the components of output, the results in Table
4 reinforce the conclusions we drew from the impulse response analysis. In all three cases
the volatility of consumption is lower under the tight rule; this fall is substantial, ranging
from 5 percent in the FL model to 29 per cent in the RoT case. Investment volatility is
slightly affected by the rule chosen by the government, except in the model with RoT
consumers, in which it rises along with αb, although in this case, we must remember
that only a small proportion of households are engaged in investment activities. In fact
the reason why output volatility increases along with αb in the models in which it does
is simply that more active fiscal rules tend to generate a stronger reaction of public
spending after a technology shock, whereas all the other components of GDP become
more stable.FISCAL RULES AND MACROECONOMIC STABILITY 30
Table 5

















b =0 .20 1.510 1.038 -0.434 2.332 0.951 -0.852
αc
b =0 .2,αs
b =0 1.425 0.837 -0.484 2.307 1.305 -0.519
αc
b =1 .0,αs
b =0 1.232 0.838 -0.351 1.946 1.598 -0.179
Output volatility and government size
Finally in Table 5 we have analyzed how the fiscal rule alters the effects of government
size on output volatility. As in Andrés, Doménech and Fatás (2004) we focus on the
elasticity of the standard deviation of output (σy)t og o v e r n m e n ts i z ea sas h a r eo fG D P
(g/y), for two different values of this variable: 0.17 and 0.51 such that the average (0.34) is
the standard size of the government sector in advanced economies. As we have shown in
Section 2, the empirical evidence indicates that economies with a larger government size
exhibit a lower output and private consumption volatility. As shown by Galí (1994) this
evidence cannot be explained by standard RBC models. Andrés, Doménech and Fatás
(2004) have accounted for these facts when the economy exhibits important nominal and
real rigidities and, in the case of private consumption, when the share of rule-of-thumb
consumers is relevant. As we can see in Table 5, although the choice of the public
e x p e n d i t u r ev a r i a b l ei nt h efiscal rule (transfers, αs
b, versus public consumption, αc
b)a n d
the intensity of the consolidation effort (different values of αc
b)h a v es o m eq u a n t i t a t i v e
effects on ∂ lnσy/∂ ln(G/Y ), these are relatively small and the main qualitative result
remains unchanged.
Thus if the negative elasticity between government size and output and consump-
tion volatility is to be considered as an indicator of the strength of automatic stabilizers in
market economies, the fact that the use of fiscal instruments is constrained to avoid large
deviations of the debt/GDP ratio does not undermine that strength either. Larger gov-
ernments operating under tighter rules are still able to lessen the size of macroeconomic
fluctuations caused by shocks to total factor productivity.
5. Concluding remarks
There is little disagreement about the success of the SGP, and other fiscal rules for
that matter, in restoring discipline in public finances. They have done so for a while,FISCAL RULES AND MACROECONOMIC STABILITY 31
until most governments have abandoned them in a more or less explicit manner. The
reasons for this fiscal fatigue are manifold, but one that has found some support among
academics is the claim that these rules make it impossible for fiscal policy to perform its
role as a stabilizing instrument. In this paper we have looked at this particular issue in
detail and found that this fear is not warranted.
To do so we have first reviewed the available evidence on the effects of fiscal
policy. As we read it, this evidence points towards an unequivocal short-run effect of
fiscal impulses on output and consumption as well as non-negligible harming effects
on the medium-term growth of excessive debt and deficits, operating mainly through
higher real interest rates and lower private investment.
Turning to the main issue of the paper we have carried out simulations on alterna-
tive models representing different views of the mechanism of intertemporal substitution
under alternative fiscal rules. The responses of output and consumption to discretionary
fiscal stimuli are not significantly affected by the nature of the rule. Nor is the operation
of automatic stabilizers drastically affected by the rule either. Again, impulse responses
are roughly similar, or even more moderate, under a tight rule than under a loose one.
Finally the volatility of output in an economy hit by technology shocks tends to be lower
and that of consumption is substantially so the tighter the fiscal rule.
Although our results are model-dependent, and other modifications of the basic
framework we have been working on in this paper might qualify our findings, the
message we obtain from the analysis conducted here is that leaving aside the issue
of deficit ceilings, there is nothing in the design of fiscal rules aimed at preventing
huge and long-lasting deviations of debt from the steady-state level that makes them
an impediment to fiscal policy carrying out its job as a significant stabilizing policy
instrument.
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